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Georgia v. McColl urn : An Unprincipled and
Potentially Unjust Ending to the
Peremptory Challenge Cases
The peremptory challenge has traditionally been considered fundamental to the empaneling of a fair jury.' Even so,
because the peremptory challenge may be used in a racially
discriminatory manner, its constitutionality has recently been
examined by the United States Supreme Court. Between 1986
and 1992 the Supreme Court decided several cases involving
alleged racial discrimination during the exercise of peremptory
challenge^.^ In the most recent peremptory challenge case,
the Supreme Court held that a criminal
Georgia u. M~Collum,~
defendant's4 exercise of a racially discriminatory peremptory
challenge is un~onstitutional.~The Court indicated that
McCollum merely follows precedents established in other peremptory challenge cased
This note discusses the Court's decision in McCollum. Part
I1 summarizes the cases which precede McCollum and upon
which the Court relied. Part I11 presents the specific facts of
McCollum and examines the reasoning used by the Court in
reaching its decision. Part IV analyzes the Court's reasoning
and focuses on two specific issues: the requirement of state
action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
1. In Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), Justice Blackmun recognized the " 'very old credentials,' of the peremptory challenge and . . . the 'long
and widely held belief that the peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by
jury.' " Id. a t 2358 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia called the right to exercise the
peremptory challenge an "ages-old right of criminal defendants . . . to secure a
jury that they consider fair." Id. at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Douglas
L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELLL. REV. 1, 10-12
(1990) (giving a history of the use of peremptory challenges in the United States).
2. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S.
Ct. 2077 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
4. The term "criminal defendant" or "defendant" is used throughout this note
to refer to the criminal defendant as well as the criminal defendant's counsel.
5. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
6. Id. at 2352-53.
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Amendment and the importance of the criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury. This note
concludes that McCollum was decided incorrectly; the holding
is not supported by the Constitution and will work potentially
unjust results for criminal defendants.

In 1880 the Supreme Court decided Strauder v. West Virginia,' the first important case dealing with the interplay of
race relations and the sitting of a jury. In Strauder an AfricanAmerican, indicted for murder, was convicted and sentenced by
an all-white jury.' While the West Virginia Supreme Court
f i r m e d the conviction, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the West Virginia law that qualified only
white persons for jury duty violated the defendant's right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend~nent.~
Nearly a century later, in Swain u. Alabama,1o the Supreme Court focused on the specific issue of racial bias in the
exercise of a peremptory challenge. This decision was the first
in a line of decisions that could be called the peremptory challenge cases." Swain, an African-American, was convicted of
rape and sentenced t o death.12 Of the eight African-Americans
on the venire, two were exempted and six were peremptorily
struck by the prose~ution.'~
Notwithstanding the exclusion of
the African-American jurors, the Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, holding that exclusion of African-Americans by the
prosecution's peremptory challenges raised only an inference of
discrimination. Before a defendant's constitutional rights could
be shown to have been violated, a more extensive pattern of
discrimination had to be demonstrated over a period of time.14

7. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
8. Id. at 304.
9. Id. at 310-12.
10. 380 U S . 202 (1965).
11. The peremptory challenge cases began in 1965 with Swain and include
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U S . 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); and Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
12. Swain, 380 US. at 203.
13. Id. at 205.
14. Id at 227.
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In Batson v. Kentucky1' the Supreme Court lessened the
"discrimination over a period of time" requirement of Swain.
Batson dealt with an African-American who had been "indicted. . . on charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of
stolen good^."'^ The prosecution peremptorily struck the four
African-Americans on the venire and the defendant was subsequently convicted by an all-white jury.'' The Supreme Court
remanded, holding that the defendant had made a timely objection t o the peremptory challenges; therefore, if "the facts establish[ed], prima facie, purposeful discrimination," the burden
shifted to the prosecution to come forward with a race-neutral
explanation for the peremptory ~hallenges.'~The Supreme
Court extended the reach of the Batson decision in Powers v.
0hio19 by holding that a criminal defendant may object t o the
prosecution's race-biased peremptory challenges even if the
defendant and the excluded juror are not of the same race.20
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete CO.~'shifted the Court's
analysis to a civil dispute. In Edmonson an African-American
construction worker sued Leesville Concrete for the alleged
negligence of one of its employee^.'^ During voir dire the defendant eliminated two African-Americans from the venire.23
The plaintiff, citing Batson, requested a race-neutral explanat i ~ n The
. ~ ~ district court denied the request, holding that
Batson did not apply t o civil proceeding^.^^ On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed26and held racially discriminatory pe-

15. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
16. Id. at 82.
17. Id. at 83.
18. Id. at 100. Enforcement of this standard may highlight the very discrimination it is intended to eliminate. Albert Alschuler points out the difficulty of enforcing the Batson Court's standard: "[Tlhe Court posed issues whose resolution
may require the judiciary to draw lines every bit as ugly and invidious as those
that the Court condemned."Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury:
Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U . CHI. L.
REV. 153, 169 (1989).
19. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
20. Id. at 1366.
21. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
22. Id. at 2080.
23. Id. at 2081.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2089.

1022 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993
remptory challenges exercised by civil litigants to be unconstit~tional.~'
This line of Supreme Court decisions regarding race-biased
peremptory challenges left open the issue of peremptory challenges exercised by criminal defendant^.^' McCollum closed
this gap when the Court disallowed race-biased peremptory
challenges by criminal defendant^.^'

A. The Facts
The defendants in McCollum were white Americans involved in an altercation with two African-Americans. The defendants were indicted on counts of aggravated assault and
simple battery. The incident occurred in Dougherty County,
Georgia, where forty-three percent of the population is AfricanAmerican. The African-American community subsequently
urged residents not to patronize the defendants' busine~s.~'
Recognizing the volatile racial situation, the prosecution
moved the court to prohibit the defendants from exercising
anticipated discriminatory peremptory challenge^.^' The motion was denied by the trial judge, and on appeal the Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed the denial.32The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that "the Constitution prohibits
a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenge~."~~

27. Id. at 2080.
28. In Batson the Court reserved the issue of criminal defendants for a later
day. 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986). The McCollum Court acknowledged this by granting certiorari "to resolve a question left open by our prior cases." Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2352 (1992).
29. McCollurn, 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
30. Id. at 2351.
31. State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. 1991).
32. Id.
33. McCollurn, 112 S. Ct. at 2359. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of
the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, K e ~ e d y ,
and Souter joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices O'Connor and Scalia
.

filed dissenting opinions.
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B. The McCollym Court's Reasoning
Drawing upon earlier cases, the McCollum Court proposed
a four-part test to decide whether the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges: (1) Does the case address the same harms
as those addressed in Batson? (2) Does a criminal defendant's
peremptory challenge qualify as state action for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment? (3) Does the state have standing to
sue for the injured jury member? (4) Does the defendant have
an overriding constitutional interest?34
1. Does McCollum address the same harms as those addressed in Batson?

In Batson the Court addressed both a public and a private
harm. With regard t o public harm, the Batson Court stated
that the integrity of the court system would be questioned by
the general public if courts allowed criminal prosecutors to
~~
exercise racially discriminatory peremptory ~ h a l l e n g e s .The
Court in McCollum believed that race-biased challenges exercised by a criminal defendant would be viewed by the public in
virtually the same way as those in Batson. As a result, the
Court concluded that the public harm addressed in McCollum
is the same as the public harm addressed in B a t ~ o n . ~ ~
In addition, the Court found the private harms comparable
in both cases. With regard to private harm, the Batson Court
stated that the discrimination would harm the dignity of the
person who experiences the dis~rimination.~'Applying this
consideration, the McCollum Court concluded that a race-biased peremptory challenge exercised by a criminal defendant
would put the excluded juror to public shame. This public
shame constitutes the same private harm to the dignity of the
.~~
both cases involved simijuror as it did in B a t s ~ n Because
lar harms, the McCollum Court concluded that the anticipated

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 2353.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 7 9 , 87 (1986).
See McCollum, 112 S . Ct. at 2353-54.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 8 7 .
McCollum, 112 S . Ct. at 2353.
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racial discrimination in McCollum satisfied the public and the
private harms addressed by Bat~on.~'
2. Does a defendant's peremptory challenge qualify as state
action?

The Court applied the Lugar test4' to decide if the criminal defendant's use of the peremptory challenge constituted
sufficient state action4' for the application of Fourteenth
Amendment constraints. The Lugar test f i s t asks whether the
action has its source in state power.42The Court decided this
element of the Lugar test was satisfied in McCollum because
the peremptory challenges exercised by the criminal defendants
in McCollum were authorized by the Georgia Code.43
The second part of the Lugar test asks if the party can
adequately be described as a state actor." The Court's decision in Edmonson added three discrete factors t o this portion of
the Lugar test.45The first Edmonson factor asks whether the
party relied on governmental assistance or benefits.46 The
McCollum Court decided this factor was satisfied since the
peremptory challenges exercised in McCollum were equivalent
to those in Edmonson-which were found t o be under assistance of the g~vernment.~'
The second Edmonson factor inquires whether the action
The
being analyzed is a traditional governmental f~nction.~'
McCollum Court decided this element was met. The Court felt
the actions of the criminal defendant in securing a fair jury
were equivalent to choosing a governmental body necessary to
By being part of the process of choosthe process of j~stice.~'
39. Id. at 2354.
40. The Lugar test comes from Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982), in which the Court held a private litigant to be a state actor when participating in the seizure of property to which the litigant claimed a right.
41. See discussion infi-a part N.A, see also Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a
Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in
a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV.808, 811-20 (1989) (discussing the state action
problem in the setting of criminal defendants).
42. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
43. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-55 (citing GA. CODE ANN. $ 15-12-165
(1990)).
44. Lugar, 457 US. at 939, 941-42.
45. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991).
46. Id.
47. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355; see also Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. a t 2083-84.
48. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
49. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355-56.
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ing a governmental body, the criminal defendant is involved in
what the McCollum Court believed t o be a traditional governmental function.50
The final Edmonson factor asks whether the injury is aggravated by governmental
Because the peremptory challenge takes place in the courtroom-thus giving a form
of governmental approval to the jury-the McCollum Court
decided the injury is indeed aggravated by governmental aut h ~ r i t y Thus,
. ~ ~ relying on the test founded in Lugar and expanded in Edmonson, the McCollum Court determined that the
criminal defendant's exercise of the peremptory challenge constitutes state action for purposes of the applicable Fourteenth
Amendment constraint^.^^

3. Does the state have standing to sue for the injured juror?
To decide if the state has standing to sue for the injured
juror, the Court 1-ookedt o the Powers test." The Powers test
initially asks if a concrete injury exists.55 This question was
already answered by the McCollum Court when it decided that
race-biased peremptory challenges put the affected juror to
public shame.56However, Powers also asks if the suing party
has a close connection t o the injured third party.57 The
McCollum Court determined this in the affirmative because a
sufficiently close connection develops between the state and the
juror during the process of voir dire.58
Finally, the Powers test requires that the injured third
party be unable t o protect himself or herself.59 The Court
again felt this factor had been met because the injured juror
would not have had the resources to bring a suit in this instance.60 consequently the Court decided, under the Powers
test, that the state has standing to sue for the injured juror.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

.

Id.
Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. a t 2083.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. a t 2356.
Id.
Id. at 2357; Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-74 (1991).
Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370.
McCoZZum, 112 S. Ct. a t 2357.
Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. a t 2357.
Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. a t 2357.
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4. Does the defendant have an overriding constitutional right?
Because no specific constitutional right to a peremptory
challenge exist^,^' the Court focused its analysis of overriding
constitutional rights on the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial
Although the
McCollum Court's holding limits the criminal defendant's use
of the peremptory challenge, the Court believed the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant are not offended. The
criminal defendant has other mechanisms with which to secure
a fair
Accordingly, the Court concluded that limiting
the criminal defendant's use of the peremptory challenge will
not threaten the criminal defendant's right to be tried by a fair
and impartial jury.64

IV. ANALYSIS
This analysis of McCollum will focus on two specific issues
before the Court: the requirement of state action under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right t o an impartial
jury. This focus is appropriate because the Court's decision
turns upon these constitutional issues. Also, these constitutional issues become especially important when the rights of a
criminal defendant are at stake.65By focusing upon these two
issues, this note will point out the McCollum decision's analytical strengths and weaknesses as well as the potentially unjust
results it could work.

61. Id. a t 2358. The Court believed that even though there is no constitutional right to a peremptory challenge, the McCollum holding does not have to undermine the validity or usefblness of the peremptory challenge. However, the Court
did acknowledge that if there were no way to remove race bias from the peremptory challenge, the Court would have to eliminate the peremptory challenge rather
than allow such discrimination. Id.
62. See discussion infra part 1V.B.
63. The Court $d not mention a specific mechanism, but the challenge for
cause could be one of the other state-created "mechanism[s] for removing those on
the venire whom the defendant has specific reason to believe would be incapable of
confronting and suppressing their racism." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. a t 2358-59.
64. Id.
65. See J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in the Adversary System: The
Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1015, 1015-16 (1990)
(describing the volatile racial setting in which criminal trials may take place).
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A. The Requirement of State Action
A finding of state actiod6 is necessary if the Court is going to prohibit the criminal defendant from exercising racebiased peremptory challenges. In other words, the actions of
the criminal defendant are subject to Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection constraints only if the criminal defendant is
determined t o be a state actor.67To decide the state action
requirement, the McCollum Court relied heavily on the previous holdings in Lugar and Edmonson. Because the "source in
state authority" requirement of the Lugar test is satisfied by
the specific language of the Georgia
the operative
question regarding state action becomes "whether the private
party charged with the deprivation can be described as a state
a~tor.'"~The Supreme Court expanded the "described as a
state actor" requirement of the Lugar test into the three prongs
addressed in Edmonson: (1)whether the party relied on governmental assistance and benefits, (2) whether the actor is
performing a trahtional governmental function, and (3) whether the injury is aggravated by governmental authority."
These three areas of inquiry were used by the McCollum Court
as a guideline for determining whether the party involved can
be adequately described as a state actor.
1. Reliance on governmental assistance and benefits

The McCollum Court perfunctorily listed the Georgia statutes which provide the service of a jury to a criminal defendant
and concluded that such state involvement satisfies the requirement of reliance on governmental assistance and benefits.
The Court supported its finding by stating that the jury system
" 'simply could not exist' without the 'overt and significant par-

66. See discussion supra part III.B.2.
67. Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases the principle
has become firmly embedded i n our constitutional law that the action
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (citation omitted).
68. The defendant's right of peremptory challenge is provided for by Georgia
law. GA. CODE ANN. 9 15-12-165 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
69. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992).
70. Id.
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ticipation of the government.' "71 While it is true that the state
makes the jury available to the defendant, it is questionable
whether the defendant, when choosing the jury during voir
dire, is actually "relying on governmental assistance and benefits" in the manner intended by Lugar.
In Lugar the party under state-action analysis brought a
civil suit in state court and sought governmental assistance for
The party bringing suit willfully
a prejudgment atta~hment.?~
became involved with the government in the attachment proceeding and willfully relied on governmental assistance. The
criminal defendant, on the other hand, is being haled into court
by the state against his or her own will. The criminal defendant is being tried before a jury provided by the state, but in
such an adversarial proceeding the criminal defendant is relying on governmental assistance only at the government's insistence.
To "rely" on the government, as it was found in Lugar,
certainly requires more volition than that exercised by a criminal defendant. In Lugar the Court characterized a party who
relies on the government as "a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents."73The distinction between the
parties in Lugar and McCollum deserves closer analysis by the
Court. That the criminal defendant is not a willful participant
with the government, nor seeks governmental assistance,
should be considered more fully before a showing of reliance on
governmental assistance and benefits is found.
This prong of the test was met only because the Court was
willing to overlook the specific language in Lugar regarding
willful participation. If the Court does not examine a party's
willful participation then the inquiry into reliance is the same
as the inquiry into the source in state authority. The Lugar
Court distinguished between these two inquiries. Such a distinction should not have been overlooked by the McCollum
Court without further explanation as to why the state actor
need not be a willful participant when relying on governmental
assistance and benefits.

71. Id. (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2084
(1991)).
72. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).
73. Id. at 941 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
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2. Performing a traditional governmental function
The McColZum Court concluded that the criminal
defendant's participation in the seating of a jury by the exercise
of peremptory challenges is a traditional governmental function. The Court believed the exercise of peremptory challenges
should be viewed as the criminal defendant "assist[ing] the
government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact."?*
While it is true that the criminal defendant can exclude certain
persons from the jury with a peremptory challenge, the Court
overstated the involvement of the defendant when it described
the defendant as "selecting" the trier of fact. There is a marked
difference between the actions of the state in providing a venire, the actions of the judge in questioning the venire, and the
actions of the criminal defendant in exercising a limited number of peremptory challenges. The defendant does nothing more
than agree or disagree with those persons called onto the venire. Such limited involvement by the criminal defendant does
not rise to the standard enunciated by the McCollum Court as
"choos[ing] a quintessential governmental body."75
The Court's conclusion that a criminal defendant exercising
a peremptory challenge is performing a traditional governmental function is further weakened by the obvious side-step of the
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Polk County u. Dod~on.'~
In Dodson the Court determined that "a public defender does
not qualify as a state actor when engaged in his general representation of a criminal defendant."?? In McCollum the Court
danced around the Dodson holding by saying there are certain
occasions where the criminal defendant can be considered a
state actor and certain occasions where he or she cannot be
considered a state actor. The exercise of the peremptory challenge is an occasion where the Court feels the criminal defendant does take on the guise of a state actor for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice O'Comor, in her dissent in McCollum, pointed out
the inconsistency of the Court's holding in this specific area:
"The Court. . . spin[sl out a theory that defendants and their
74.
Co., 111
75.
76.
77.

McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991)).
Id. at 2356.
454 US. 312 (1981).
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356 (footnote omitted).
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lawyers transmogrify from government adversaries into state
actors when they exercise a peremptory challenge, and then
change back to perform other defense f~nctions."'~Justice
O'Connor believed Dodson foreclosed the Court's decision in
McCollum regarding state action and there was no need for
further inquiry by the Court." Although Dodson may not rule
out all further inquiry into state action on the part of the criminal defendant, it does weaken any analytical support for the
McCollum Court's finding. By side-stepping Dodson, rather
than overruling it, the Court provided only weak support for its
finding of state action and little guidance for future interpretation of that finding.
3. Aggravation of harm by governmental authority

Because of the negative public perception of discrimination
occurring in the courtroom, the McCollum Court concluded that
the public injury is aggravated by governmental authority:
"Regardless of who precipitated the jurors' removal, the perception and the reality in a criminal trial will be that the court
has excused jurors based on race, an outcome that will be attributed to the State."8o Such analysis focuses primarily on
the aggravation of public harm. By limiting its analysis to the
public harm, the Court passed over the private harm-a factor
which was vital to the overall harm addressed by the Court in
Bat~on.~'
The private harm involved in a racially discriminatory
peremptory challenge is a harm to the individual juror who
experiences the discrimination. Such harm to the individual
juror is not "aggravated" because it occurred in a courtroom.
Discrimination is undesirable wherever it may occur-in the
courtroom, a t the club, or in school. The courtroom setting
cannot be determined to categorically increase the personal
injury of someone who experiences such discrimination. In fact,
discrimination in the courtroom during peremptory challenges,
78. Id. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2356 (footnote omitted).
81. The Court acknowledged earlier in the opinion that there are injuries to
both the public and the juror: 'The experience of many state jurisdictions has led
to the recognition that a race-based peremptory challenge, regardless of who exercises it, harms not only the challenged juror, but the entire community." Id. at
2354 n.6. Even so, the focus of the Court's analysis in this part of the opinion was
on the public injury.
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if it takes place may not even be recognized by the juror as
di~crimination.'~
By focusing on the public harm, the Court avoided the
issue of private harm t o the juror. This is because the private
harm is not aggravated by the courtroom setting. However, it is
the injury t o the individual citizen which goes t o the heart of
the protections guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court's focus under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis should
be on the private harm and the juror's offended individual
rights, not on the public image of the system of justice. Because
the private injury is not increased by a courtroom setting, the
analysis of the McCollum Court only marginally satisfies the
"aggravated harm" prong of the state action test.
Careful analysis of the Lugar test shows that the elements
of the test are not sufficiently satisfied by the facts of
McCoZZum: the criminal defendant cannot be singled out as one
who willfully relies on governmental assistance or benefits as
did the plaintiff in Lugar; the criminal defendant has very
limited involvement in the traditional governmental function of
seating a jury; and the injury is aggravated only for purposes of
public, not private, harm.
Given the gravity of the constitutional requirements that
flow from a finding of state action, the Court should reconsider
the weak showing which the facts of McCollum make under the
Lugar test. Of course, if the requirement of state action is considered unsatisfied in the setting of criminal defendants, the
Court would be unable to reach the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and hence unable to reach the
alleged racial discrimination. Justice O'Connor commented on
the role of the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment at the end of her dissent: "That the Constitution
does not give federal judges the reach to wipe all marks of
racism from every courtroom in the land is frustrating, to be
sure. But such limitations are the necessary and intended consequence of the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement."83

82. "Indeed, it is common practice not to reveal the identity of the challenging party to the jurors and potential jurors." Id. at 2356 n.8. If the juror is unable
to attribute the challenge to a certain party, then the racially motivated nature of
the challenge may not be obvious to the juror.
83. McColZum, 112 S. Ct. at 2364 (07Connor,J., dissenting).
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B. Overriding Constitutional Interests of the
Criminal Defendant
As a separate factor in determining its holding, the
McCollum Court considered the overriding constitutional interests of the criminal defendant.84Under this prong of the test,
it considered the criminal defendant's right t o a peremptory
challenge and the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a fair and impartial jury.
Under an analysis of the criminal defendant's right to a
peremptory challenge, the Court acknowledged the long history
and tradition of the peremptory challenge and the "widely held
belief that the peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial
by
The Court also reaffirmed its statement in
Edmonson that "the role of litigants in determining the jury's
composition provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury
system and of its v e r d i ~ t s . "~~v~e nwith the recognized importance of the peremptory challenge in seating a fair jury, the
Court felt no constitutional constraints upon its power to limit
the criminal defendant's free exercise of the peremptory challenge: "[Pleremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created
means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury."87
After discussing the peremptory challenge, the Court
turned to an analysis of the criminal defendant's constitutional
rights under the Sixth Amendment. To be sure, this entailed a
balancing of the Equal Protection Clause and the Sixth Amendment.88The criminal defendant's right to a fair and impartial
jury lost. The Court quickly disposed of the criminal
defendant's right to an impartial jury by concluding that it is
protected by other mechanisms through which the defendant

84. See discussion supra part III.B.4.
85. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
219 (1965)); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1985).
86. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991)).
87. Id.
88. We do not believe that this decision will undermine the contribution
of the peremptory challenge to the administration of justice. Nonetheless, "if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel
as fair," we reaffirm today that such a "price is too high to meet the
standard of the Constitution."
Id. (citation omitted).
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may remove someone who is supposedly race-biased. The
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights deserve further examinati~n.~~
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas asserted his own
arguments against the Court's holding and did not join the
dissent only because Edmonson "requires the opposite conclu~~
sion" and the state did "not question E d m o n s ~ n . "Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion was motivated by his belief that
McCollum would work unjust results for future criminal defendants. Although in McCoUurn the Court reached an instance of
discrimination against an African-American juror by white
American criminal defendants, Justice Thomas felt there will
be cases in which an African-American criminal defendant
wishes to have a fair and impartial jury. Because of the limitations upon the peremptory challenge, such a defendant may not
be able to remove those whom he or she believes are unable to
be race-neutral in their performance of jury duty. Adding punctuation to his feelings of potential injustice, Justice Thomas
said: "I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the
day that this court ventured down this road . . . ."91
In the courtroom, the criminal defendant is aided greatly
by the peremptory challenge in securing a fair jury. The right
to challenge a juror who is suspected, for whatever reason, of
being unable to render a fair verdict is one which is vital to the
protection of the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a fair jury. The Court should not lightly pass over this constitutional right, o r conclude so quickly that it will not be affected by the ruling in McCollum. It was the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair jury that motivated the Court in the first in-

89. Because our criminal justice system gives certain advantages to the accused, the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury
may deserve added weight when being balanced against the Equal Protection
Clause. See Goldwasser, supra note 41, at 821-26 (discussing the advantages which
are given to the accused a t trial). Even so, no presumption was given to the accused by the McCollum Court when balancing the Sixth Amendment with the
Equal Protection Clause.
90. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at, 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91. Id. a t 2360. Justice Thomas's opinion is supported by the Supreme
Court's holding in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 US. 303 (1880). I n Strauder the
Court acknowledged that "prejudices often exist against particular classes in the
community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in
some cases to deny to persons of those classes the fill enjoyment of that protection
which others enjoy." Id. a t 309.
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stance to call the peremptory challenge a "necessary part of
trial by

C. A Proposed Solution: Acknowledge the Fourteenth
Arnendment's Inability to Reach the Criminal Defendant's
Peremptory Challenge
Professor Douglas L. Colbert has suggested the use of the
Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit racial discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory challenge^.^^ Professor Colbert feels
the Thirteenth Amendment would side-step the problem of
state action required under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such
a solution to the requirement of state action is no longer necessary, given the McCollum Court's finding of state action on the
part of the criminal defendant in exercising peremptory challenges. However, Colbert's article forcefully points out the concerns criminal defendants should have now that the Supreme
Court has reached the issue of discrimination in the criminal
defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges: "Criminal defendants generally rely on the peremptory challenge to assure that
the selected jurors will be fair and impartial. . . . Although a
juror's bias, racial or otherwise, may be exposed during the voir
dire, responses given during this process are unlikely to result
in a successful challenge for ~ause.'"~
The holding of the Court in McCollum will have a direct
effect on the ability of the criminal defendant to have a fair
and impartial jury; taking away the peremptory challenge
leaves the criminal defendant with only a challenge for cause.
The total elimination of the peremptory challenge, which the
Court has made a step toward in McCollum, would leave-the
criminal defendant with insufficient recourse against a racebiased jury.
The Court should have acknowledged the inability of the
Fourteenth Amendment to reach the area of criminal
defendants' peremptory challenges. Although the problem of
discrimination may continue, the laudable cause of eliminating
such discrimination has been decidedly left to another forum.
The way in which the Court stretched its analysis of state
action to reach this area of potential discrimination attests of
92. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.202,
219 (1965)).
93. Colbert, supra note 1.
94. Id. at 121-22 (footnotes omitted).
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the desire of the Court to stamp out any trace of race discrimination, but such actions should not be taken at the expense of
a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. A criminal defendant-who may be facing the prospect of extended incarceration or even the death penalty-has a
fundamental and important right t o a fair and impartial jury.
Because the peremptory challenge is so vital t o securing that
right, the Supreme Court should not have limited it upon such
a questionable showing of state action.

The McCollum Court interpreted the constraints of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause t o necessitate holding as unconstitutional race-biased peremptory challenges exercised by a criminal defendant. The Court stretched
the requirement of state action in order to reach the criminal
defendant with such Fourteenth Amendment constraints. Considered analysis under the Lugar test shows that the criminal
defendant cannot fairly be described as a state actorg5when
exercising peremptory challenges and the Court should not
have reached a Fourteenth Amendment analysis in McCollum.
The McCollum Court also gave insufficient attention t o the
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right t o a fair and impartial jury. That right is protected by the exercise of peremptory challenges t o remove unwanted jurors. The McCollum
holding puts what could become a formidable limitation on the
criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges and
ultimately a limitation on the criminal defendant's right to a
fair and impartial jury. Such a limitation will work unjust
results for criminal defendants and therefore deserves greater
consideration when being balanced against possible racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Eric E. Vernon

95. "Certainly, it is difficult to imagine anyone less a 'state actor' than a
criminal defendant." Goldwasser, supra note 41, at 820.

